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ABSTRACT
Legislative-executive conflict has been an element of the American
system of government since its constitutional birth. Its roots are in
the "separation of powers". The author believes that the personal bias
and sectional interests of Congress are minimal in this study of Defense
Reorganization. The conflict pits the military prestige and voter popu-
larity of President Eisenhower against a conservative Congress jealously
guarding its constitutional powers "to raise and support armies" j "to
provide and maintain a Navy"; and "to make rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Force t .!» The study follows developments
from the President's first mention of reorganization in his State of the
Union Message until the final legislation is signed. The final bill is
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The theory of separated powers is clear and concise „ Congress
makes the laws and the President administers thenu This may have been
satisfactory in the nineteenth century, but it cannot be applicaple
today, The President, with his advisors in the executive department,
is now in a better position to recognize the need for, and formulate,
comprehensive legislation for the nation. This is especially true in
the area of military organization where the President is intimately
involved in his role of Commander in Chief, Executive initiative in
law making has not evolved with the unconditional endorsement of
Congress. It has, in fact, created a gulf between the legislative and
executive branches of the national government. This gap, with its
roots deeply embedded in the doctrine of separated powers has been a
source of rivalry and hostility between Congress and the President
at intervals throughout our national history.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
It is the purpose of this study to review the Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, to determine (l) the extent of
legislative-executive conflict and (2) the effect the conflict had
on the law as enacted.
IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY
Much has been written on the subject of legislative-executive
conflict. It is generally exposed against the backdrop of domestic

issues such as the farm problem, civil rights, and other socio-economic
problems. This tends to cloud the conflict behind the sectional inter-
ests and personal bias of Congress. Granted, these elements can never
be completely divorced from any issue, but their influence may be les-
sened. Assuming sectional interests and personal bias minimal, this
study attempts to follow the evolution of the Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958, focusing attention on legislative-execu-
tive conflict.
DEFINITION OF TERMS USED
Legislative. The term legislative, when used as a noun, shall
be the Congress, including both the House of Representatives and the
Senate.
Executive . Executive shall mean the executive branch of the
government, headed by the President and including the Secretary of
Defense and his assistants.
Conflict . Conflict is interpreted as meaning the pressures re~
suiting from a clash or divergence of opinions.
ROOTS OF CONFLICT
Before proceeding with the specific Department of Defense Reor-
ganization Act of 1958, the roots of legislative-executive conflict
should be understood • The Constitution itself is obviously the pri-
mary source.
The importance which the framers of the Constitution placed upon
the legislative power can be deduced from its dominant position as
Article I. Section 1 states?
2

All legislative power herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives,
Section 8 enumerates the specific powers pertinent to military
organization.
To raise and support armies, v .
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces;
,,. And
To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the forgoing Powers and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States , or in any Department or Offices thereof.
The executive power is "vested in a President" in Article II, and
in Section 2, the President is given the office of "Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States,"
Congress and the President are therefore independent of each other
drawing authority from separate clauses of the Constitution and "acquir-
ing power and influence from separate constituencies through different
systems of election".-*- Individual congressmen are primarily local rep-
resentatives responsible to a local constituency whereas the President
is considered to represent the people as a whole.
However, the framers did not contemplate a complete separation*^
In Article II, Section 3» they expressly directed that the Presidents
,,. shall from time to time give to the Congress Information
of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration
such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient „«,
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier _and_.the ,State a (Cambridge;
Belknap Press, 1957), p. 401,
George B. Galloway, The Legislative Process in Congress ,,
(New York; Thomas Y. Crowell Company , 1955), P • 438
.

The broad language of the Constitution has been responsible for
its durability. The broad language of the Constitution has also led
to duplication of functions. True to the fears of Madison and Hamilton,^
Congress has invaded the executive field through intensive investiga-
tions
,
appropriations in specific detail, and public censure of admin-
istrative officials. Not forseen by The Federalist Papers authors was
the emergence of the President as a legislative leader. Herman Finer
has saids
...the only single legislative program that gives unity,
direction, and coherence to the timetable of Congress is the
program of work put before it by the President - often in the
form of carefully drafted bills,
^
The President's role as a legislative leader is probably the core
of legislative-executive conflict. Harold J. Laski considers it partly
a matter of pride. Congress takes orders from no one but itself. He
also believes there is a real fear in Congress of being overshadowed
by the President, ->
To enforce alterations is to draw attention to itself...
Congress establishes its prestige when it either refuses to
let the President have his own way or compels him to compromise
with it. 6
Possibly Lord Bryce has described the inevitability of legislative-
executive conflict better than any other. He made the following analogy
2
^Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist
Papers
,
(New Yorks The New American Library, 1961), No, 48$ p. 309 s and
No. 73, PP. 442-443.
^Herman Finer, The Presidency
,
(Chicago i The University of
Chicago Press, i960), p. 61,
^Harold J. Laski, The American Presidency » an Interpretation
„
(New York; Harper & Brothers, 1940), p. 115.
6Ibid

.o.But there is among political bodies and offices (i.e.
the persons who from time to time fill the same office) of
necessity a constant strife ^ a struggle for existence similar
to that which Mr. Darwin has shown to exist among plants and
animals | and as in the case of plants and animals so also in
the political sphere this struggle stimulates each body or
office to exert its utmost force for its own preservation. „.
'
\James Bryce^, The American ^Commonwealth „ (New Yorks the McMillan





"No inhibition had operated more inexorably to limit the pace and
nature of (President) Roosevelt's moves to stop Hitler in 1940 ^ and 1941 i
than his estimate of what the Congress would stand for 5 or would muster
1the votes to support if legislation was required." After Pearl Harbor
the legislative situation was transformed. Military decisions about
military organization and operations could be based solely on military
grounds with no consideration for political implications. Of lasting
significance was the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS came
into being without the benefit of legislation, executive order,, or
even a letter. When it was finally proposed to legitimize JCS with
an executive order , the President "rejected the idea as unnecessary
and cramping".
*
The wartime JCS consisted of the Army Chief of Staff , the Chief
of Naval Operations a and the Commanding General of the Army Air Gorps
with the Chief of Staff to the President^ Admiral Leahy p presiding
over JCS meetings with no vote. Admiral Leahy's office in the White
House greatly facilitated the tendency to by-pass the civilian secre-
taries of the military departments. Although rivalry and feuds did
exist j, the wartime operation of the joint chiefs was successful and
^Walter Millis^ Arms and the State (New Yorks The Twentieth
Century Fund, 1958 ) s p. 62.
2Ibid
. 9 p . 105.

good for inter-service cooperation. What one service did, it did as
the executive agent carrying out a joint decision.
The prospect of unity in a peace-time economy of limited resources
was the problem facing the military after World War II, The really
driving force for unification came from the Army Aviators who had public
opinion overwhelmingly behind them. Since a separate Air Force could
not be denied, the problem became one of organization » The Army, under
Secretary Patterson, the Navy,, under Secretary Forrestal, and the
Congress , all worked up proposals. The final reorganisation established
was essentially a Patterson/Forrestal compromise modified by Congress
to exert their authority.
National Security^ Act .of__194?
Official unification began with the National Security Act of 1947*
The act created the "National Military Establishment" made up of the
three military departments and headed by the Secretary of Defense.
It established the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare strategic and
logistic plans, and serve as chief military advisors to the President
and Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs were provided with a Joint
Staff of 100 officers. The Secretary of Defense was given only '"general
direction, authority and control" over the three services , The secre-
taries of the military departments retained major control over their
departmentsS
3
"Defense Reorganization Plan Approved", Congressional .Quarterly,
Almanac
9
(Washington i Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1958), XIV, p. 134.

12.49- Amendmentg
The 19A-9 Amendments attempted to improve the position of the Secre-
tary of Defense, The "National Military Establishment " became the
Department of Defense and the language covering the Secretary's power
was altered to "direction, authority, and control"1 over the three
"separately administered" military departments. In addition, the
Secretary was given three Assistant Secretaries of Defense. The Joint
Chiefs were strengthened with the creation of a non-voting chairman
and an enlarged Joint Staff of 210 officers.^
Later^Change
s
President Eisenhower believed in strong centralized control. One
of his first acts after taking office in 1963 » initiated Reorganization
Plan No. 6. It was designed to further strengthen the top levels of
the Defense Department. The Secretary was authorized six additional
Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the chain of command to unified
commands was firmly established. The chain ran from the President,
through the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the appropriate
military department to the unified commander.
5
The military organization of the National Security Act as amended
was a compromise between the advocates of strong centralized control
and the proponents of a decentralized military establishment. In the
extreme it was a compromise between the one service, one secretary,
one chief of staff philosophy and the philosophy of three services
,






In a peacetime environment^ the demand for the economic utiliza-
tion of resources^ by itself
s
was a strong motivator for central direc-
tion and control. Congress^ however ^ has always been a conservative
body^, slow to act on legislation and slow to accept radical change
In the absence of external pressures 9 it is doubtful that any new at-
tempt at reorganization would have been made 9
THE SEEDS OF REORGANIZATION
In the fall of 1957 » the publicly proclaimed success of Soviet
Russia in intercontinental ballistic missile development and produc~
tion served as the catalyst to focus attention and criticism on mili-
tary organization. Critics maintained that inter-service rivalry in
weapons use and production worked to the advantage of the Soviet Union,
Considerable editorializing on a so called '"missile-gap" filled the
pages of newspapers and periodicals. Undoubtedly President Eisenhower
recognized the time as propitious for the introduction of new reorgan-
ization legislation.
The President first broached the subject of reorganization in his
State of the Union Address in January., 195&. Commenting that he would
not pass judgement on the charges of harmful service rivalries „ he
continued
2
Recently I have had under special study with the intimate
association of Secretary McElroy (Secretary of Defense) the
never ending problem of efficient organization^, complicated
as it is by the new weapons. Soon my conclusions will be
finalized. I shall promptly take such executive action as is
necessary and,, in a separate message ^ I shall present appro-
priate recommendations to the Congress,"
%ew York Times,, January 10 „ 195# 5

President Eisenhower ^ fortunately s was in a unique position to
take the role of legislative leader on the subject of military reorgan-
ization. He had successfully directed the combined Allied forces
against Hitler B s Germany in World War II, He was regarded as an expert
on all military matters. He enjoyed as much popular support as did
Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the height of the "New Deal". However^
unlike Roosevelt^ he faced a Congress dominated by the opposite poli-
tical party. His stature as a military leader and his popularity as
a President were to be pitted against a conservative^ democratic
Congress
,
With the local constituencies unaffected by a military reorgan-
ization^ the question of where Congress stood in early 1958 9 is a
matter of speculation. After a Senate Preperadness Subcommittee
investigation
s
Senator Stuart Symington had publicly recommended
legislation to unite military command at the top. « The opposite view
was voiced by Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia,*, Chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee. He declared %
I have not seen one single example of inter-service rivalry
with a deleterious effect upon our war efforts.
...Those who seek efficiency and savings in our national
military establishment would do well to look at the Department
of Defense as a department which is superimposed above the
military departments. It has grown from a planning organization
to an operational organization."
To support his words with action,, Mr. Vinson^, with Representative
Leslie G. Arends of Illinois ^ senior Republican member of the Armed
?New York Times a January 3$, 1958.
%ew York Times,, January 5 S 1958.
10

Services Committee, and Representative Paul J. Kilday of Texas, senior
Democrat en the Committee, proposed identical reorganization bills.
Their bills called for a drastic reduction in the Secretary of Defense's
staff, specific limits on the powers of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller), while preserving the basic structure of the
department. Since these bills were referred to their own committee
and no further action taken, it is probable that this was primarily
a political maneuver to officially state their opposition to any pend-
ing proposals to increase the authority of the Secretary of Defense.
Presidential-Congressional Meetings
With such opposition, it is probable that the administration had
difficulty shaping its plan in acceptable language c In order to guage
the opposition, the President held a number of unpubiicized meetings
with Congressional leaders. Probably the most significant briefing
occurred on the night of April 1, when he conferred with Senators
Russell and Saltonstall, and Representatives Vinson and Arends, the
9Chairmen and senior Republicans of the two Armed Services Committees.
What discussion transpired in this meeting Is not known ; but the pro-
posals delivered to Congress two days later must have been \ d upon
the Pr ;ent ! s ssti - ' Congi pj >sition. He fly had




On April 3, the President delivered his long awaited message to
%ew York Times, April 2, 195S.
11

Congress. Eisenhower built his proposals on the foundation that?
Separate ground 5 sea^ and air warfare is gone forever. If
ever again we should be involved in war^, we will fight in all
elements
s
with all services # as one single concentrated effort.
Peacetime preparation and organizational activity must be com-
pletely unified. 10
The President's proposals were tos
1. Give the Joint Chiefs of Staff clear cut operational as well
as strategic planning responsibilities over unified commands.
2. Grant the Secretary of Defense wider flexibility over appro-
priations^ including the right to transfer funds from one service to
another.
3. Remove the Secretaries of the Army 5 Navy 5 and Air Force from
the chain of command for operational decisions and downgrade the tra-
ditional military departments to agencies responsible for training
and administration.
4. Strengthen the Joint Chiefs by enlarging the Joint Staff.
5. Create a position of Defense Director of Research and Engi-
ag«
6. Grant the Secretary of Defense a direct role in the appointment
of high ranking officers. 11
Congressional Reaction
Congressional reaction against control over appropriations by the
Secretary of Defense was immediate and vocal. Representative Kilday
said it was "probably greater economic power than should be possessed




by one individual". Senator Bridges said it would be a 'complete
surrender" by Congress of the power of the purse, "and that is one of
the few assets we've got up here". 12 This was the prevailing attitude
throughout both houses of Congress.
The President failed to consider that the power of the parse
constituted Congress' primary tool for the control of Executive action.
Viewed as a direct attempt to usurp Congressional power,, this proposal
received practically all the recorded criticism. If objections to the
remaining proposals existed* they did not receive any attention.
The President waited for nearly two weeks before presenting his
draft bill to Congress. Possibly the April 3 message was a final
attempt to measure his opposition. The real issues would be revealed
in the draft bill.
PRESIDENT'S DRAFT BILL TO CONGRESS
On April 16, the President sent the draft of his bill to Congress
accompanied by a letter. In an apparent attempt to quiet the gathering
storm, he pointed out "there were no provisions relating to appropriated
funds". 13 By this significant omission, a major obstacle to the
President's program dissolved. However, he attempted another route to
consolidate the power of the Secretary of Defense. He requested that
the Secretary be given the authority to transfer, merge,, or abolish
roles and missions of the services. This proposal had been condition-
ally proferred in preliminary meetings with Congressional leaders;
12Ibid.




rejected when opposition proved strongs and omitted from the earlier
message proposals in favor of the "Lamp-sum" appropriation request.
With stronger opposition to the appropriation request, the President
may have decided Congress would accept the lesser of two evils.
In addition, the President introduced a new proposal which was
destined to become as controversial as the one dropped. He asked for
a repeal of Section 3 9 paragraph (5) of the Unification Act which per-
mitted service secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff to appeal directly
to Congress. 1^
A third proposal was also destined to become an issue. In spell-
ing out unified direction, the President requested that wherever the
Unification Act called for the services to be "separately administered",
the "separately administered" clause be eliminated. 5
The President's letter emphasized the concept of unity and concluded:
The essence (of unity) can be stated in a nutshell. Unified
strategic plans, carried out in peace or war under unified direc-
tion, presuppose that the directing head, the Secretary of Defense -
Joint Chiefs of Staff mechanism, has sufficient authority over
supporting activities to assure execution of the basic plans,,
This I submit, is the sum total of unification.-^
Representative Vinson, unaccountably silent after the President's
speech on April 3, elected to assail the draft in an hour long speech
on the House floor. He took issue with the President's assertion that
modern warfare required an extensive revamping at the Pentagon. He




l6Ncw_York Times , April 17, 1958.
14

the Constitution of the United States, 1 ' 1 '
In fact^ Mr. Vinson based his speech on the Constitutional power
of Congress. In his concluding remarks,, he said,
I believe that in our form of government 5 the Executive
can have adequate freedom of action in military matters with-
out necessitating an abdication by Congress of its responsi-
bilities, 18
The President's Appeal
Excerpts of Mr. Vinson's speech were widely reported. Also con=
siderable editoralizing on the President's proposals had transpired.
Significantly
s
the President's first appeal for support came before a
joint luncheon meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors and
the International Press Institute, He called the essence of his pro=
gram "safety with solvency". After emphasizing possible economies
resulting from the reorganization ^ he answered the popular criticisms
of his program. Summing up, he said there would be I
NO single chief of staffs
NO Prussian staffs
NO Czars
NO forty billion dollar blank checks
NO swollowing up of traditional services 5
NO undermining of the constitutional powers of government , -9
' Congressional. Record s CIV, p, 658?
18Ibid .„ p. 6591
o
19New York Times, April 18, 1958,
15

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARINGS
Wasting little tirae s the House Armed Services Committee opened
hearings on April 21 p with Secretary McElroy as first witness. Mr.
McElroy
a obviously in a conciliatory mood s offered to abandon the
Administration request for restricted Congressional access for the
chiefs of staff and secretaries. Also^, he abandoned the adminis-
tration argument that an important reason for the program was to
effect economies. 2®
Before the committee April 25 » Mr. McElroy was agreeable to a
sweeping rewriting operation^, as long as it preserved the substance
of his testimony o He insisted the following provisions be retained
s
(1) That the new law delete provisions that the individual
services be "separately administered".
(2) That the new law remove the 210 man ceiling on the Joint
Staff.
(3) That the secretary be given clearer authority to transfer
or abolish roles and missions. ^
On the question of roles and missions^, Charles A. Coolidge s a
Secretary of Defense specialist s admitted the present wording of the
bill could theoretically lead to the abolition of the Marine Air Arm
and the Army's missile activity. 22 However 9 this intent was emphat-
ically denied by all administration witnesses.
2QNew York Times, April 2k s 1958.
21Ibid
^2New York Times, April 29 and May 3, 1958.

The military witnesses who followed were quizzed thoroughly and
critically. As expected, General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman of the
JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) and General Thomas B. White, Chief of the
Air Force, strongly supported the President's program. 2^ General
Maxwell B. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff also supported the Administra-
tion bill. However, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, after supporting the "intent" of the program, confessed mis-
givings about most of the principal clauses in the bill.
Admiral Burke saw no need to repeal the "separately administered"
clauses of the Unification Act. He expressed apprehension over the
proposed "transfer of functions" power for the Secretary of Defense.
He feared the bills phraseology would permit significant reductions
in Naval Aviation and the Marine Corps. He recommended limits for
the new Joint Staff to prevent it from developing into a national
general staff. 2/+
The final military witnesses were the former Chairmen of the JCS,
General of the Army Omar N, Bradley and Admiral Arthur W. Radford,
They both strongly endorsed the President's reorganization program.
Admiral Radford was concerned that the services might resist change.
He concluded his testimony by predicting that the next ten years would
bring tremendous changes and the bill "sets the stage for necessary
flexibility in the future". 25
23New York Times , May 1, 1958.
2i+New York Times , May 2, 1958.
2
^New York Times, May 1, 1958.
17

The Committee devoted the majority of its attention to military
witnesses. A possible explanation was suggested by Edward L. Katzenbach,
Jr. He theorized that the testimony of military witnesses has more
meaning for Congressmen thai 1, that of high Pentagon Officials <> 2" More
than one official has served for a relatively short period of time
before business or "personal" reasons beckon him back home. The
Congressman has usually spent more time on military affaira than has
the civilian official.
Throughout the hearings^ the civilian and military witnesses had
all agreed on one point, Even those supporting the bill conceded that
the bill suffered from language trouble which could "pave the way for
the sweeping exercise of executive power". Yet, all witnesses agreed
that this was not the intent of the Administration. 27
A Related _Deyglgjgpent
A development related to the hearings came to light on May 7.
The President's press secretary acknowledged that the President was
waging a letter writing compaign to business friends seeking support
for his bill.2°
In the letter, President Eisenhower suggested that the Department
of Defense was analogous to a giant corporation with subordinates re-
porting independently and directly to the board of directors, by-passing
^Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr. "The Pentagon's Reorganization
Muddle", Nation 18sl4-lB s May 15, 1958,
27New York Times „ May 13, 1956.
28New York Times, May 12, 1958.
18

the chief executive completely. He argued that "'this would be com-
pletely unworkable" and could not be tolerated In the competitive
business world* Of course, the competition facing the Department of
Defense was the military might of the Soviet Union, The President
concluded his letter with the following pleas
If this little comparison with corporate practices appeals
to you as helpful in appreciating the crying need for defense
modernization, I hope that you and others will find it useful
in awakening the public to the grave seriousness of the matter. ^9
On May 22, the committee on Armed Services presented their bill
on reorganization to the House, Committee vote was 3? yeas and no
30
nays.-'
As expected j, the committee approved the non controversial items
of the Administration's bill. However, virtually all of the controver-
sial language which would have given the Secretary of Defense sweeping
powers over the services was dropped or rewritten. The committee re-
fused to incorporate two changes requested by the President in a let-




The first major objection dealt with the administrative command
channels. The committee had dropped the -"separately administered 51
language, but had substituted, each military department would be "sepa-
29New York Times , May 13, 1958.
30




rately organized under the direction^, authority and control of the
Secretary of Defense exercised through the respective secretaries of
such departments 118 ^^ The President wanted the "exercised through"
clause eliminated.
The second objection was the most crucial one, The President
was not satisfied with the way the committee had handled the Secre-
tary's power to abolish, merge, or transfer functions. The Committee
granted this power
s
effective after giving thirty days notice to
Congress
s unless one or more members of the Joint Chiefs objected.
If an objection was received. Congress had sixty days in which to
pass a concurrent resolution restraining the Secretary from the con=
templated action. The President wanted the time limit reduced to a
flat thirty days with an act of Congress required to restrain the
Secretary,33
Since an act would be subject to Presidential veto, this sug-
gestion could never be reviewed by congress favorably.
The committee discussed its actions thoroughly in "Report No,
1765 ", Their concluding arguments were based on Constitutional re=
sponsibilities of Congress.
It is apparent that under the constitution , the power of
Congress over the Military Establishment is, and was intended
to be,, complete, save for the power to command the forces they
create
,
Congress has never considered this responsibility to consist
merely in providing funds as requested by the executive branch to




33Ney_ York Times a May 17, 1958.
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would be unable to discharge its constitutional responsibilities
or to insure that the views of the American people, as expressed
by their elected representatives, are observed by the executive
branch of the government. 34
To the People
With the committee adamant in its stand, the President again took
his case to the people in vitriolic language, He considered the clause
which required administrative action "through the respective secretaries 111
as a ''legalized bottleneck". 35 On the Secretary's authority to transfer
functions, he critized the power granted to the Joint Chiefs. He argued
that the objection of one man would automatically keep any proposed
changes tied up for sixty days. He called it an "endorsement of dupli-
cation and standpatism in defense".36
The President was especially critical that paragraph (5) of section
3 had not been eliminated. This is the paragraph which granted the
Joint Chiefs access to Congress. He said the language was best described
as "legalized insubordination". He added
s
It invites interservice rivalries; invites insubordination
to the President and the Secretary of Defense ; endorses ideas of
disunity and blocking of defense modernization, suggests that
Congress hopes for disobedience and interservice rivalries; is
bad concept, bad practice, bad influence within the Pentagon,37
House Report No. 1765, 85th Congress, p„ 40,
3$New York Times , May 29, 1958,
36Ibid.




Having failed in his attempts with the committee^, President
Eisenhower was determined to make a strong fight on the floor of the
House. On June 6$ he invited 15 leading Republican Representatives to
breakfast and enlisted their support. The President's tactical xaanuever
amounted to an announcement that Representative Martin ^ the Republican
floor leader c, would introduce new language to deal with the controvert
sial items, Of even greater significance^, the New York Times reported
that on the day debate of the bill opened
s
word was passed through the
corridors of the House that "Republicans opposing the President on this
one would find themselves "out in the cold 8 at the White House, M^8
The White House pressure was apparently successful. Starting
with Representative Arends^ the Republican members of the committee
took the floor and after initially lauding the coiEmittee bill 9 recom-
mended recommittal to consider the new language. *'
The motion to recommit the bill developed into a political power
struggle but was rejected by a roll call vote of 192=211. The voting
was?
TOTAL DEMOCRATS REPUBLICANS
YEA 192 20 175
NAY 211 196 15
The Bill itself passed on a roll call vote of 402=1.^°
3gNew York Times, Jane 2 S 195
8
3^Congressional Record,, GTV8 pp. 10889
«





The Senate irmed Services Committee, sitting in its customary-
position of appellate review on legislation originating in the House^
opened its hearings on June 17. Listening to the same witnesses who
had appeared before the House Committee , the Senate was generally more
tolerant of Administration witnesses. One significant clash did occur.
Secretary McElroy's Mistake
After Admiral Burke had repeated his testimony criticizing the
Administration amendments, Secretary licElroy remarked in a press con-
ferences
I am disappointed in him, regard it as regretable. ...I
don't see how a service chief can fail to be aware of the strong
interest of the President about these amendments. It seems to
me it would be very difficult for a Chief or me to be unaware
that the President is Commander in Chief and that he wants these
amendments «,^-
Senator Russell took sharp exception with Secretary McElroy's
public rebuke of Burke. He suspended further testimony until McElroy
furnished "clear and unequivocal" assurance that reprisal action would
not be taken for candid opinions expressed to Congress. Russell asserted
the McElroy statement was "startling proof" of the necessity for keep-
ing in law the provision that a service chief come to Congress on his
own initiative.^2
^New York Times , June 22, 1958.




The Senate version of the House-approved bill, reported July 1?^,
conformed raore closely to the President's requests. On the problem
of "transferring, abolishing, or merging" functions, it eliminated the
provision that any member of the Joint Chiefs could force Congressional
review. The Senate version provided that committees of either the
Senate or the House would have 30 legislative days to consider any
"function" proposal. Tf a committee of either chamber disagreed with
the change^ then the Senate or House would have 45 days more to con-
sider it. If a majority of the chamber involved upheld the coinmittee's
veto j, the recommendation would be negated. 4^
The administrative clause "exercised through 1* the respective
secretaries was amended by striking cut the controversial clause ^
Section 3 paragraph ^5) of the Unification Act remained intact
,
Direct access to Congress for service secretaries and chiefs of staff
was assured.
There was surprisingly little debate on the Senate floor and on
July 18, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act- passed the Senate,
80=0, exactly as it had been reported by the Committee.4 -'
FINAL ACTION
The bill reported out by the conference committee was essentially
the amended bill of the Senate, House conferees did not insist
.Q^Q . _Almanac. ,; op,, cit . , p, 13
&
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on their version because, although some language changes had been made,
the intent was still the same.
On July 24i> the House and Senate passed the conference report by
voice vote and the bill went to the President. On August 6, upon sign-
ing the bill into law, the President made the following statement'
I have approved HR 12541, the Department of Defense Reorgan-
ization Act of 195S. Its enactment represents a major advance in
our organization for defense. While some time will be required
for its complete implementation, the Secretary of Defense is be=
ginning this action at once. In order to maintain the proper
relationship of the positions of the President, the Congress and
the Secretary of Defense, I am instructing the Secretary of
Defense that any report to the Armed Services Committees of the
Congress as to changes of functions established by law, as
prescribed in this act, shall be forwarded first to the President.
Now that this measure has become the law of the land, I know
that the personnel throughout the military establishment, civil-
ian and military, will cooperate fully with the Secretary of







The Department of Defense E "organization Act of 1958 provided a
classic example of legislative-executive conflict,, Congress jealously-
guarded its constitutional power "to raise and support armies":; "to
provide and maintain a Navy"';; and "to make rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces 80 ^ against the attempted inroads
of President Eisenhower's reorganization plan* The President used a
number of executive ploys in an attempt to enforce his will on the
Congress. He repeatedly met with Congressmen.; he appealed to the
public for support ^ and he eventually used the threat of witholding
political support from opponents of his bill.
The first major victory for Congress resulted from the outcry
against "lump-sum" appropriations to the Secretary cf Defense. The
power cf the purse is the most sacred and powerful weapon in the
Congressional arsenal. The opposition to such a proposal was so
unanimous that the President retreated and did not include it in
his draft bill.
If Congress approved the President's plan pertaining to the
Secretary of Defense's power to "transfer$ merge,, or- abolish funct-
ions" of the military departments ^ considerable de facte, control of
the services would have legally passed to the Secretary. Again
Congress balked. The final language reserved the ultimate decision
for Congress if it wished to intervene.
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The considerable controversy over the Secretary" s administrative
power ^ especially the "administered through the department secretary"
clause,, defies comprehension. The House committee made a strong stand
on retaining the clause. The Senate committee considered it relatively
unimportant and readily eliminated the clause. The conference committee
accepted the Senate version with apparently little opposition. House
reluctance to accede to the President's desire could have been a
stubborn resentment of executive attempts to prescribe the actual lar=
guage of the bill.
If there ever was a chance that Congress would delete the provi-
sion in the National Security Act permitting service Chiefs to appeal
to Congress directly, it was permanently eliminated by Secretary
McElroy's public rebuke of Admiral Burke. Senator Russell" s action
suspending the hearings until he received assurance that there would
be no reprisals could not have been misinterpreted by the Administration.
CONCLUSIONS
Many critics hailed the passage of the bill as a victory for the
President. However, the bill that he signed had significant changes
from the draft bill he originally submitted. That concessions to more
centralized executive authority were made must be attributed to the
influence of President Eisenhower, The final bill was definitely a
compromise. It embodied the President's ideas with the permanent stamp
of Congressional influence.
Has the Act provided a satisfactory framework within which the
Department of Defense can operate efficiently? Secretary of Defense
27

Robert McNamara apparently finds it adecuate. His forceful leadership
has created s ome controversy ^ but, nothing requiring Congressional in.ter=
vention. He has his critics in Congress ^ but his competence and ability
command respect. He has been publicly lauded by Congressional leaders
on numerous occasions. Under Mr. McNamara, the Reorganization Act has
proved workable and successful.
Even under Mr. McNamara 5 the question of "how much power for the
Secretary of Defense" is not dormant. No less than the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Compbri 1! V rles.J, Hit^h^ is on record >:ith
the following statement s
Unfortunately the superficial illogicalities of decentra=
lization are more strikingly obvious than the deadening con=
sequences of extreme centralization.^
If the man at the helm were other than Mr. McNamara , would the
organization still be workable and successful? What if a weak
Secretary were appointed who could not provide the leadership the
position demands? Or what if an extreme authoritarian Secretary
attempted to overstep the lawful constraints of his office? Such
situations could develop. If they did5 legisiative=executive conflict
would be unavoidable. The nation received the benefit of a workable
Defense Department organization when President Eisenhower challenged
the 85th Congress. Will we be as fortunate the next time?
3
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